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Challenges of Information Security Incident Learning: An Industrial 
Case Study in a Chinese Healthcare Organisation 
Security incidents can have negative impacts on healthcare organisations and the 
security of medical records has become a primary concern of the public. 
However, previous studies showed that organisations had not effectively learned 
lessons from security incidents. Incident learning as an essential activity in the 
“follow-up” phase of security incident response lifecycle, has long been 
addressed but not given enough attention. This paper conducted a case study in a 
healthcare organisation in China to explore their current obstacles in the practice 
of incident learning. We interviewed both IT professionals and healthcare 
professional. The results showed that the organisation did not have a structured 
way to gather and redistribute incident knowledge. Incident response was 
ineffective in cycling incident knowledge back to inform security management. 
Incident reporting to multiple stakeholders faced a great challenge. In response to 
this case study, we suggest the security assurance modelling framework to 
address those obstacles. 
Keywords: information security, incident response, incident learning, healthcare, 
security assurance modelling 
1. Introduction 
Security incidents have affected healthcare organisations across the world, such as 
Veterans Affairs' data loss incidents [1, 2] in North American, National Health Service 
(NHS) Surrey IT asset disposal incident in UK [3] and Shenzhen hospital's data loss 
incident [4] in China. Industry reports indicated that the number of security incidents 
happened in healthcare organisations was increasing. Symantec reports showed that the 
healthcare industry accounts for 36\% of the total security incident breaches in UK in 
2013 [5]. At 44\%, the healthcare industry continued to be the sector responsible for the 
largest percentage of disclosed data breaches by industries in 2014 [6]. 
A patient's medical record is a collection of personal information including 
“identification, medication history, dietary habits, sexual preference, genetic 
information, psychological profiles, employment history, income, and physicians’ 
subjective assessments of personality and mental state among others” [7, 8]. Healthcare 
information security has become a primary concern of the public [9-16]. Waegemann 
claimed that the disclosure of a patient's medical record could ruin or damage an 
individual's career, and result in dismissal from work, and loss of health insurance [17]. 
Data loss incidents can also cause financial loss to healthcare organisations. Healthcare 
organisations will be fined if they failed to protect patients' personal information. For 
instance, the healthcare organisations in UK were fined hundreds of thousands pounds 
following data breaches affecting thousands of patients and staff [18-20].  
Security incident response is the process that aims to minimise the damage from 
security incidents and learn from such incidents. There are well-documented 
methodologies such as the SANS [21] and NIST SP800-61 models [22] that divide this 
process into several distinct phases including preparation, identification, containment, 
eradication, recovery and follow-up. A key activity in the “follow-up” phase is the 
capacity to learn from the errors or mistakes made throughout the incident handling 
process, to learn about the effectiveness of security policies, procedures, technical 
processes and to feed this knowledge back into the “preparation” phase [22]. The 
response to these lessons learned should ideally cycle relevant knowledge and changes 
into the procedures that guide incident response and result in changes in the training 
processes and incident response policies. However, case studies [23-25] showed that 
incident learning is ineffective in the organisations. 
During the “follow up” phase, the recommendations and insights derived from 
previous security incidents should be disseminated through a series of formal and 
informal reports, meetings and presentations to management [21, 26]. Lessons learned 
to document included the effects of the damage, actions taken during the incident, 
policies and procedures that required a change and evidence that can be used for 
pursuing the responsible person [21] Previous research showed that security lessons had 
not been effectively learned within the organisations. For example, a series of case 
studies [23] performed in the financial organisations showed that risk assessment 
processes in the organisations were not informed by data on previous incidents 
including impact and probability of occurrence, and there is a lack of communication 
between related security functions in the organisations. We have not found any business 
case study in incident learning in healthcare organisations. 
In UK and North America, there were some initiatives such as incident reporting 
to encourage incident learning. The objective was to reduce the recurrence both where 
the original incident occurred and elsewhere. In China, little study can be found 
regarding incident learning as information security was not the main concern of the 
healthcare providers and governments [27, 28] in the past. Until recently, Chinese 
healthcare organisation started to realise the importance of healthcare information 
security. Health information security was stressed in the Management Measures for 
Population Health Information (for Trial Implementation), issued May 5, 2014 by 
China’s National Health and Family Planning Commission of China. This paper 
conducts an industrial case study in a Chinese healthcare organisation to investigate 
their challenges and obstacles in incident learning. It will then present a model to 
address the identified challenges. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as the following. Section 2 reviews 
related work. Section 3 introduces the industrial case study. Section 4 reports the results 
of the case study. Section 5 discusses the findings and proposes the security assurance 
modelling framework to address the problems identified in the case study. Section 6 
summarises the conclusions and identifies future directions. 
2. Related work 
2.1 Lessons learned and Security Incident Response and Handling (SIRH) 
Security Incident Response and Handling (SIRH) can be defined as “the process 
that aims to minimise the damage from security incidents and malfunctions, and 
monitor and learn from such incidents” [29]. There were well-structured models 
provided by SANS, NIST and ISO 27035 models consisting of several distinct phases to 
isolate an incident and appropriately respond to it, including preparation, identification, 
containment, eradication, recovery and follow-up [30]. A “follow-up” phase is an 
essential stage of the SIRH. A key activity in this phase is to learn from the errors or 
mistakes made during the incident. It is important to identify policies and processes that 
undermine existing defences. It is also important to identify any weaknesses in staff 
competency. These insights must then be fed back into security management procedures 
[21, 26]. 
 
Although standard incident response models put an emphasis on incident learning, 
organisational practices in incident response were still limited to the technical process 
and were not very engaged in post-incident learning activities. The case studies 
performed by Ahmad showed that the organisation had focused on improving the 
technical aspects and did not leverage opportunities to learn about incidents [24, 25]. He 
then proposed a double-loop model for incident learning [24] and a dynamic security 
learning (DSL) process model elaborating different learning activities in different 
learning stages, key stakeholders involved and its linkage with broader organisational 
aims [25]. Tondel [31] had identified the key challenges of incident learning which 
included the lack of willingness to share incident learning with other organisations [32] 
ineffective communication between IT professionals and other stakeholders [32] the 
lack of incident learning motivations [32] as well as the insufficient sharing of security 
lessons within the organisation [23]. 
2.2 Lessons learned dissemination 
Traditional ways to disseminate lessons learned about an incident included a series of 
formal reports, emails, newsletters, meetings and presentations to management [26, 33]. 
For example, NHS shared and disseminated lessons learned from security incidents 
using team meetings, notice boards, incident reporting and investigation training 
courses (e.g. use of case studies), emails, newsletters, internal alert systems and so on 
[34]. Emails, newsletters, meetings and presentations to management contained less 
information comparing to the formal post-incident reports. Post-incident reports 
documented information obtained throughout the security incident investigation 
process. Example post-incident reports included the VA data loss incidents [1, 2] from 
the US, the NHS IT asset disposal incident [35] from UK. They provided a reference 
that can be used to assist in handling similar incidents [26, 36]. Contents included the 
causes of the incident, the recommendations on remediation, the security requirements 
violated and improvements on procedures. Although this information was inter-related, 
details can be scattered throughout a report, which resulted in ineffective 
communication of security lessons [37]. This problem has been compounded by usually 
lengthy written security incident reports, which can be hundreds of pages [1, 2]. 
2.3 Lessons learned dissemination in healthcare 
In Europe and North America, there were some initiatives in encouraging the 
dissemination of lessons learned in the aftermath of security incidents. In the US, the 
security incidents were reported to Nation's Healthcare and Public Health Information 
Sharing and Analysis Centre (NH-ISAC). In UK, NHS report Serious Untoward 
Incidents that involved the unauthorised disclosure of confidential patient information 
to the Caldicott Guardian [38] the Senior Information Risk Owner (SIRO) and the 
relevant Information Asset Owner for consideration of any actions [34]. A Serious 
Untoward Incident related to Personal Identifiable Data was defined as “the actual or 
potential loss of personal data and/or any information that could lead to identity fraud or 
have other significant impact on individuals or the organisation” [34]. The key aim of 
serious incident reporting was to reduce the recurrence both where the original incident 
occurred and elsewhere [34]. In China, there have not been requirements found for 
healthcare organisations to report security incidents and learn from lessons. Health 
information security has not attracted significant attention by the healthcare providers 
and governments [27, 28] in the past few years, although some attempts have been 
made to protect health information [39-42]. Gao suggested two main reasons for the 
lack of motivations: (1) the Chinese traditional culture does not address the importance 
of personal privacy; and (2) healthcare systems in China are still in their infancy and 
there has not been large-scale health data exchange that can potentially trigger large 
amounts of serious privacy violations [43]. However, the implementation of healthcare 
information systems can hardly be successful if health information security cannot be 
ensured [44]. 
3. The exploratory industrial case study 
This section conducted an industrial case study with people working in a healthcare 
organisation in China. The objective was to have a deeper understanding of security 
incident learning practices in healthcare organisations. In particular, we investigate into 
the obstacles and challenges in incident learning within this organisation. 
3.1 Background 
A five months internship was accepted in 2013, with a Chinese healthcare organisation, 
the redacted hospital, on a newly initiated Security Strengthening Program (SSP). The 
redacted hospital started using an electronic healthcare system from 2008 and was 
looking for recommendations to improve their security system. This internship provided 
the opportunity to obtain more knowledge about security incident learning in a 
healthcare organisation in China and their support enabled us to conduct an exploratory 
industrial case study. 
The redacted hospital was a tertiary level hospital in China and had the highest 
level of maturity in terms of healthcare information systems. As a tertiary level hospital, 
the security and reliability of the health information system were highly important. 
Failure to prevent security incidents can have negative impacts on organisation's critical 
ability to function. 
3.2 Healthcare security compliance regulation 
The security management of Chinese healthcare organisations was subject to 
compliance regulation through security standard GB/T22239 (Information security 
technology - Baseline for classified protection of information system) [45]. The 
guidance used a five level information security classification system. Organisations 
were required to comply with the GB/T22239, by achieving an appropriate level. For 
example, the guidance of the health industry information security level protection issued 
by the Ministry of Health of the Peoples Republic of China requires that health 
information systems and related units should be self-examined in accordance with 
GB/T22239. In particular, the tertiary level hospital needed to achieve at least the third 
security level characterised in GB/T22239 [46] 
3.3 Organisational security culture and awareness 
The hospital had included security training in the staff induction and this was 
mandatory. It included the training on how to properly handle patients' private 
information and how to apply appropriate data protection protocols. However, there 
were no refresh training sessions for the staff. Employees are not provided with 
accessible information security materials to update their knowledge probably because 
information security is not a priority for healthcare professionals [47].  Comparing to 
the healthcare professionals, the IT professionals got additional training. They were 
encouraged to attend IT professional training courses and get certifications. The hospital 
also held security incident sharing sessions for training purposes as part of the incident 
response follow-up activities. In addition, the organisation has a stated aim of achieving 
a secure operation by following the security standards [45]. Administrative actions will 
be taken against the employees who violated the security policies. However, they 
arguably did not have activities to promote good security practices such as rewarding 
staff for good security behaviour [48, 49].  
3.4 Security incident handling process 
Most of the incidents in the hospital were due to hardware failures, human errors (e.g. 
not following the correct procedures), and policy violation (e.g. the illegal use of USB 
devices). Hardware failures can usually be solved very quickly either by fixing the 
technical problem or by replacing it. Business procedure based human errors are always 
difficult to solve. It took long time to find out what goes wrong at which level.   
As opposed to separated responsibilities [24, 26] in handing security incidents 
and general incidents, the redacted hospital had the IT department responsible for 
handling all incidents. The IT department treated security incidents equally as general 
incidents. When a security incident happened, it was logged through phone calls to the 
IT department. Phone call was the primary way used to report incidents. The IT 
department also provided a walk in service for incident reporting. Almost all the 
incidents were reported through phone calls. The redacted hospital did not have an 
electronic incident logging system to manage incidents, and the work was all paper 
based. 
After incident notification, the severity level of the security incident was then 
decided according to different severity levels defined by the organisation. The severity 
levels were defined according to the incidents' impacts on services and reputation. Low 
severity incidents referred to those that affected only a small part of internal systems, 
and did not have direct impacts on patients, for example if there was only one end user 
computer down and this failure would not propagate to affect other parts of the system. 
High severity incidents referred to those that were critical to the systems' ability to 
function, with high severity of risk, and impacts on patients, such as the crashing of a 
critical business function. It also included the incidents that could damage the 
organisation's reputation, for example the release of patients' private information. A 
post-incident review was then followed for the high severity incidents. Informal 
meetings were also held to disseminate the lessons learned to different stakeholders.  
3.5 Organisational structure and participants 
The hospital had two main divisions, which were medical division, and administrative 
division. They report to the general director of the hospital. IT department was part of 
the administrative division. Five IT professionals worked in this department consisting 
of four IT engineers and one IT manager. All of them were involved in daily incidents 
response and handling. To comprehensively understand incident learning within the 
organisation, we interviewed people from different job roles which included ten 
healthcare professional (nurses and doctors) and five IT professionals. We have chosen 
these roles because healthcare professionals are the majorities handling medical records 
and IT professional are the key personnels dealing with incidents.   
The sample was limited by our desire to conduct detailed and focused interviews 
with key individuals in healthcare organisations. Healthcare and IT professionals within 
hospitals and medical centres faced an increasing array of demands and requests that 
left little opportunity to participate in these studies. We were, therefore, extremely 
grateful for their participation in the qualitative feedback sessions that were documented 
in this part of the paper.   
3.6 The study process 
This study adhered to the BPS ethical guidelines, and had been approved by the 
FIMS ethics committee of the University of Glasgow (ref: CSE01243). The participants 
completed the consent form before starting the study. Participants were invited to fill in 
the background questionnaire. This collected the demographic information including 
job position, gender, education background, years of working experience and 
experience with security incident handling. We conducted semi-structured interviews 
with each participant individually in this study. We had chosen this approach instead of 
group interviews because the participants were reluctant to share their own attitudes 
towards security with their colleagues. They feel more comfortable to have private 
conversations.  
As suggested by NIST, SANS, and ISO/IEC 27035, the main activities in 
incident learning are incident knowledge gathering, dissemination and knowledge 
feedback. We thus focused on three main themes for this interview,  
• Incident knowledge gathering 
• Incident knowledge dissemination. 
• Incident knowledge feedback. 
We were not allowed to record the conversations due to the sensitivity of the 
research themes. Therefore, we took field notes during the interview. After the study, a 
summary based on the field notes was generated and sent to the informants for 
confirmation and acceptance within one hour. This was to validate the information's 
accuracy and completeness. All confirmations were returned by the participants. The 
results can be accessed and were analysed by the first author only. 
4. Results 
This section presented the major themes in the data. The findings were grouped 
according to the research themes. The data was further cross-referenced with the 
collected document for triangulation [50] 
4.1 Background questionnaire 
The healthcare professionals who participated in this study, included four doctors 
(males) and six nurses (females). Their working experience ranges from two to 
eight years. The educational background of the nurses was at high school or 
undergraduate levels. All of the doctors had bachelor's degree or above. Among 
the healthcare professionals, two nurses and one doctor had been involved in the 
security incident handling process. The rest of them had no experience with 
security incidents. Five IT professionals participated in this study. Four of them 
were IT engineers (one female and three males) and one of them was an IT 
manager (male). The IT engineers had two to four year's experience and the IT 
manager had eight years working experience. The educational background ranged 
from high school to masters. All of the IT engineers had experience with security 
incident handling. 
4.2 Incident response and knowledge gathering 
Incident response was handled differently for incidents with different severity 
levels. For low severity incidents, a security engineer was assigned to the incident 
till the incident was solved or mitigated. For high severity incidents, an incident 
response team was formed, which included the IT manager, at least two IT 
professionals and other people involved in this incident. Knowledge gathering 
was also different for incidents with different severity levels. 
 
4.2.1 Low severity incident 
The handling of low severity security incidents focused more on technical aspects to 
recover business functions, and placed less emphasis on knowledge gathering of the 
lessons learned from those incidents. This is evidenced by the following statements 
provided by the participants from different job roles, 
Health Professional: “... for low severity incidents, we inform the IT department 
... they solve them very quickly and leave ... we are not very much involved ...” 
Security Manager: “ ... the business function is the most important, everyone 
must prioritise it, to turn the system back to normal.” 
Security Engineer: “ ... we can close case when the problem was solved... I 
sometimes keep technical notes for these low severity incidents, ... but we are not 
required to do so.” 
We can see that the health professional who had reported the incident was not 
involved in the knowledge gathering procedure. The incident handling details were 
either not documented or partly documented in the redacted hospital. Based on 
observations, the hospital did not conduct reviews for low severity incidents. From 
documents review, we did not find a written requirement in their security management 
procedures about gathering incident knowledge for low severity incidents. 
4.2.2 High severity incident 
The handling of high severity incidents was more comprehensive. A security 
incident team was formed to investigate the incidents. There was a formal process to 
gather and generate incident knowledge. A review occurred for every high severity 
incident. Meetings were held to gather information about the incident investigation and 
mitigation. 
Security Manager: “ ... for an administrative purpose, we require the incident 
response team to produce incident reports following severe security incidents...” 
Security Engineer: “ ... we will have meetings to review those [high severity] 
incidents and elaborate details about the causes and solutions taken to solve this issue...” 
Health Professional: “ ... for low severity incidents ... , ... we are not very much 
involved ... However, for high severity incidents, we are asked to describe details about 
what we have done in handling the incidents ...” 
Health Professional: “ ... report how we have discovered the incident, how we 
have tried to respond to the incident, incident reporting ...” 
We can see that the redacted hospital had made some efforts to collect incident 
information from the staff involved in high severity incidents. The health professional 
who had reported the incident was also engaged in the knowledge gathering procedure. 
Lessons were documented and there was a post-incident report generated after the 
incident. After reviewing their incident reports, we found these reports included 
information such as business impact, causal analysis and remedial actions. The number 
of pages of incident reports reviewed ranged from 7 pages to 60 pages depending on the 
complexity of the incidents. The report described a complete story about how the 
incident had happened, incident reporting, analysis, and mitigation. 
4.3 Information dissemination 
4.3.1 Low severity incident 
For low severity incidents, security engineers randomly kept technical notes 
about the knowledge obtained from the incident handling process. However, they were 
for personal use only and were not shared with others. This is supported by the 
following statement, 
Security Engineer: “ ... I sometimes keep technical notes for future reference ... , 
... might be helpful if I encounter the same problem next time ...” 
When reviewing those notes, we found they were documented in a free style 
way either using tables or pure texts. The hospital did not have a systematic way to 
document and manage learning for low severity incidents, hence created further 
difficulties in disseminating this knowledge. 
4.3.2 High severity incident 
For high severity incidents, lessons learned were disseminated through 
department meetings within the organisation. Security engineers were responsible for 
incident knowledge dissemination. However, they were unsure whether this knowledge 
dissemination was effective, 
Security Engineer: “ ... some incidents contain complicated technical details, I 
try to explain but I am unsure to what extent they (healthcare professionals) can 
understand...” 
Security Engineer: “ ... it's not easy to communicate technical terms ... , ... 
stories are most interesting and people like them ...” 
Incident dissemination in such flexible manner caused troubles. The healthcare 
professionals complained about the clarity and the lack of incident knowledge being 
distributed. Healthcare professionals who had not been involved in the incidents 
claimed that, mitigation. 
Health Professional: “ ... sometimes in departments meeting, security engineers 
showed up to discuss a security incident ... about how it happened and handled, to be 
honest, i am not quite sure I can understand them all, I will still need their [security 
engineers] help ... when I encounter a similar one in the future.” 
Health Professional: “...  they [security engineers] tell the story about an 
incident, sometimes using technical terms ... I don't think I can completely digest.” 
As mentioned earlier, the organisation produced post-incident reports for high 
severity incidents. These reports were for administrative purposes and were hardly 
accessible by people outside the incident response team. Even if these reports were 
made available, they were still hardly usable. Employees who had seen the reports 
found it difficult to digest as they contained comprehensive inter-related information. 
This is supported by the statement of a healthcare professional who had seen the 
incident reports, 
Health Professional: “… the document is so difficult to read, a lot of background 
information ... everything is mixed together ...” 
Based on the analysis above, the information dissemination of the high severity 
incidents was ineffective. This is due to the complicated nature of the incident itself and 
ineffective communication between the security engineers and the healthcare 
professionals. 
4.4 Lessons learned feedback 
Lessons learned should ideally be used to inform the improvements of security 
management. Throughout the analysis of qualitative data collected, we were trying to 
search for evidence on how lessons learned from previous incidents had fed back to 
security management procedures. 
For low severity incidents, there were only occasional informal knowledge 
feedback activities performed by the security engineers. As mentioned, they took 
technical notes for handling similar incidents that may happen in the future, but these 
were not shared with each other. A statement from a security engineer had demonstrated 
an understanding of the importance in incident knowledge feedback.   
Security Engineer: “ ... when a similar incident re-occur, I always go back to 
check previous notes. They are useful, if everybody can share this information ... we can 
learn from each other's experience and save efforts ...” 
The healthcare professionals were also aware of the importance of incident 
learning and suggested to include incident case study examples in the organisation's 
security training courses. 
Security Engineer: “ ... should consider including some [incident] examples in 
the security training courses ...” 
The security manager had a deeper understanding of incident knowledge 
feedback and linked security lessons with security management procedures.  
Security Manager: “ ... lessons learned is important to prevent similar incidents 
in the future, there might be some generic similarities between those incidents ...” 
Security Manager: “ ... the real causes might be somewhere in the security 
procedure itself, that a procedure makes people repeat mistakes.” 
We can see that, the IT professionals were aware of the importance of lessons 
learned feedback, however, the hospital did not effectively communicate learning of 
lessons with the security management policies/guidelines/standards. When examining 
the incidents reports, we found that these had not stated clearly whether the incidents 
were caused by inappropriate implementation or the lack of relevant policies/guidelines/ 
standards, or whether the lessons learned had led to the revision of 
policies/guidelines/standards. The whole incident response process lacked of a 
mechanism to feed back lessons to the security management procedures. 
5. Discussion 
Based on the analysis in previous sections, the organisation had a relatively complete 
incident handling procedure including preparation, incident investigation, incident 
mitigation, post-incident learning, an incident response team [26] as well as rules of 
incident response according to the incident severity levels. However, we have identified 
some problems from their incident learning process. 
5.1 Incident learning and knowledge gathering 
SANS and NIST SP800-61 models suggest to produce a detailed post-incident 
report following a severe security incident. These reports can be used to assist in 
handling similar incidents, training new team members and leading to the update 
of incident response policies and procedures [26]. Examples can be found online 
such as the VA data loss incident reports [1, 2]. In our case study, the redacted 
hospital had a documented requirement in their security procedure to generate 
post incident reports documenting business impact, in-depth causal analysis and 
remedial actions for high severity incidents. Incident reporters were also involved 
in the knowledge gathering procedure. For low severity incidents, the redacted 
hospital seemed to focus more on technical aspects to recover business functions, 
and placed less emphasis on knowledge gathering. Security engineers randomly 
took technical notes for personal use but these notes was not shared with others. 
Incident reporters were not very much engaged. This indicated poor 
collaborations between the incident handler and the incident reporter. This 
findings is also shared by Ahmad [24, 25] and Tondel [31] According to Cook, 
critical incidents were caused by ignorance of low impact incidents and all 
incidents should be used for incident learning [51]. This was not occurring in the 
redacted hospital. Ineffective knowledge gathering tends to result in the waste of 
the knowledge generated in the incident handling process [24].  The findings were 
consistent with Ahmad's case studies in financial organisations [24, 25]. However, 
our study was placed in a healthcare context and the target group included not 
only IT professionals but also healthcare professionals. The importance of 
information security for different job roles is usually different [52]. This provided 
us with diversified perspectives from different participants. 
 
5.2 Information dissemination 
As suggested by NIST, SANS and ISO 27035, lessons learned about an incident 
should be disseminated through formal reports, emails, newsletters, meetings and 
presentations to management [26, 33]. The organisation did not have a systematic 
way to document and manage low severity incidents. This created difficulties in 
disseminating lessons learned. For high severity incidents, lessons learned were 
disseminated through department meetings, however, incident learning was not 
communicated effectively to the healthcare professionals. Although a detailed 
post-incident report was produced, it was hardly accessible by people outside the 
incident response team. Moreover, healthcare professional complained about the 
lengthy textual reports and found them difficult to digest. The reports were written 
from an administrative perspective rather than an incident knowledge sharing 
perspective [37] We can see that incident dissemination in both oral and written 
were not effective in the organisation. This finding was also share by Ahmad [24, 
25] and Tondel [31] This indicated poor communication between incident 
response teams and other stakeholders. Previous researches [53, 54] argued text 
alone does not facilitate the communication of security lessons. There is a need 
for the conversion of post-incident reports into learning documents, which can be 
easily understood by people in the organisation. Reporting incidents to multiple 
stakeholders with varying levels of competence and background knowledge was 
found to be a key challenge for security management.  
 
5.3 Lessons learned to feed into security management procedures 
Learning from security incidents can help avoid serious incidents [55] and should 
ideally improve information security management procedures [24]. NIST, SANS 
and ISO 27035 has stressed the importance of incident learning and continuously 
improvements to security management procedures. However, in our case study 
incidents were not effectively informing improvements of the management 
procedure in the redacted hospital. The low severity incidents were not properly 
documented and were not linked to the security procedure. For high severity 
incidents, the post-incident reports did not clearly document the linkages between 
lessons learned and security procedures. This raised a question on how to 
effectively cycle lessons learned into security management procedures. Ahmad 
[24, 25] proposed a double loop learning model and a dynamic security learning 
(DSL) process model to address this issue. The DSL process model contains six 
fundamental processes explaining how learning should occur. It also considers 
key stakeholders and its linkage with broader organisational aims. It provides a 
step-by-step procedure-based method to improve incident learning.  
 
We will introduce security assurance modelling framework to address these 
problems. In particular, our approach aims to provide a unified way to gather 
incident knowledge and tackle the obstacles of incident reporting to different 
stakeholders. It also brings in argument theory that allows people to reason about 
relationships between the lessons learned and security standards. Next section 
introduces the security assurance modelling framework.  
 
5.4 Incident learning and the assurance modelling framework 
This case study has identified the problems in incident learning and the needs for 
an approach that can provide a unified way to gather security knowledge and can 
help effectively disseminate incident knowledge to inform security management 
procedures. We suggest adopting the security assurance modelling framework to 
address these problems. The following sections introduce the framework and 
justify how it can address the challenges identified in incident handling process. 
 
5.4.1 Security assurance modelling framework 
The security assurance modelling framework is based on argument theory [56, 57]. It 
presents a documented body of solutions that provides a convincing and valid argument 
that a specified set of critical claims regarding a system are adequately justified in a 
given environment [57] As shown in Figure 1, this framework consists of three main 
components. Security Requirements & Objectives serve as claims (e.g. “Access to 
sensitive system resources is restricted and monitored”).  Security Argument serves as 
arguments (e.g. “Argument over GB/T22239”) and Security Lessons Learned serve as 
solutions (e.g. “Use encryption, or other effective tool, to protect personally identifiable 
information stored on removable storage”). The idea is to map security lessons to the 
organisations security requirements documented in the security standards/guidelines/ 
policies through using security arguments.  
Figure 2 presents a workflow chart on how to apply the assurance modelling framework 
to link lessons learned with security requirements. The framework starts with top level 
security claim identification, which can be phrased as “The healthcare information 
system is secure”. It then leads to three directions, which are “Sub requirements 
needed”, “Supporting lessons needed” and “Security arguments needed”.  
• “Sub requirements needed” is elaborated with different levels of security 
requirements of the security standards/guidelines/policies. For example, the 
redacted hospital used GB/T22239. It had a five level information security 
classification system. This procedure ends until it reaches the level that all sub-
requirements of the security standards/guidelines/policies are added to the 
framework.  
• “Supporting lessons needed” is elaborated with the security lessons identified 
from the incidents. The security lessons that were not covered or addressed by 
the security standards can be added to the framework. These security lessons can 
compliment the current security standards. Some of the security lessons might 
conflict with existing security standards, then an argument needs to be 
developed to deal with the conflictions. This procedure ends until all the lessons 
learned are added to the framework. 
• “Security arguments needed” typical deal with the conflictions between the 
lessons learned and the existing security standards. It can also be used to 
document the stakeholder's subjective comments towards the security incidents 
and the security standards. This feedback can also enrich the organisations 
security standard. This procedure ends until all the arguments development have 
completed for this framework. 
We can see that this framework captures security requirements, lessons learned as well 
as the stakeholders subjective comments towards the incident. It also provides a way to 
link security lessons to the security requirements through security arguments. The 
implementation of this framework can be supported by the graphical notations such as 
Goal Structuring Notations (GSN) or Claims-Argument-Evidence (CAE). These 
notations have been widely adopted in security areas \cite{53, 58-61} to develop 
security requirements. They capture lessons learned and security requirements at 
different levels of abstraction and provide structured ways to represent security 
assurance models. The following sections will elaborate on how it can help address the 
obstacles in security incident learning identified in this case study. 
5.4.2 Incident gathering and Assurance modelling 
In the case of the redacted hospital, we have identified the organisations' weaknesses in 
security knowledge gathering and representation. They did not have a structured way to 
gather incident knowledge for low severity incidents. Incident report documented for 
high severity incidents are not for incident preventing and learning purpose. The 
assurance modelling framework can be applied to address these problems. This is based 
upon previous researches into the application of this approach to gather and represent 
security lessons from different data sources, including news articles, money penalty 
reports and other security incident reports [37, 62]. In particular, it gathers security 
lessons and classified them according to different levels of technical and managerial 
security controls.  We suggest the redacted hospital follow this framework to gather 
security incident knowledge. However, questions remains on how security engineers 
can apply this technique to gather this information during incident handling process in 
an industrial setting. 
5.4.3 Incident dissemination and assurance modelling 
We also identified the redacted hospital's weaknesses in disseminating security incident 
learning. Our results showed that security engineers in the organisation had realised the 
importance in sharing lessons learned for low severity security incidents rather than 
taking freestyle notes for their own reference. Security incident reports generated for 
high severity incidents were found to be difficult to digest and can hardly be used for an 
incident learning purpose. There a need of an effective way to present incident 
knowledge that can facilitate incident knowledge dissemination. Security assurance 
modelling framework can serve this purpose as it was found to be able to effectively 
communicate security incidents [37, 54]. It can be applied to convert incident reports 
and represent lessons learned in a structured manner. Another challenge identified from 
the case study was how to report incidents to multiple stakeholders with varying levels 
of competence and background knowledge. The security assurance modelling 
framework can represent security incidents at different levels of abstractions, however, 
the level of details need to be scalable and adjusted to fit into the needs of people from 
different job roles. 
5.4.4 Cycle back security knowledge and assurance modelling 
This case study showed that the redacted hospital has placed an imbalanced focus on the 
technical aspects and maintenance of business continuity, and did not leverage 
opportunity to reuse the security lessons to inform security management procedures for 
future prevention. Incident knowledge was presented in either a freestyle way or lengthy 
incident reports had resulted in the difficulties to cycle incident knowledge back to the 
security management procedures. The assurance modelling framework can be used to 
address this problem. It links security lessons with different levels of security 
requirements defined in the security policies/guidance/standard/regulations. Through 
mapping security lessons to the security requirements, it allows the users to track which 
security requirement goes wrong at which level and whether there is a need to update 
the existing security management procedure. This idea can be supported by similar 
research work in the area of security assessment, where assurance modelling framework 
has been used to evaluate a security standard, the Common Criteria [63, 64]. Through 
capturing and constructing security arguments, it revealed 121 issues in a standard that 
has already been subjected to several rounds of ad hoc reviews. The results showed that 
the assurance modelling framework was able to detect the incompleteness and 
weaknesses of the security standards [63].   
Recall that in section 3.2, the security management of Chinese healthcare 
organisations is subject to compliance regulation through security standard GB/T22239. 
However, security standard is not always perfect and has been criticised as they are 
validated by appealing to common practise and authority only, which is not a sound 
basis. The assurance modelling approach can be adopted to cycle back incident 
knowledge to inform the improvement of security management procedures. However, 
questions remain on how security engineers can apply this technique to ensure a 
continuous improvement of the existing security standard/guidelines informed by the 
incidents.  
6. Conclusions and future work 
Lessons learned from security incidents should ideally inform the improvements of 
organisation's security management  procedures. However, previous case studies in 
financial organisations showed that lessons learned had not been effectively learned. To 
explore this issue, we conducted a case study in a healthcare organisation.  
Through semi-structured interviews with healthcare and IT professionals and 
reviews of their existing incident handling documents, we found that the organisation 
placed an imbalanced focus on technical aspects rather than collecting incident 
knowledge. The organisation did not have a structured way to gather incident 
knowledge and had not effectively disseminated incident learning for both high severity 
and low severity incidents. Incident knowledge had not been effectively fed back and 
led to the changes of security management procedures. To the best of our knowledge, 
there have not been existing case studies about security incident response and learning 
in healthcare organisations. This paper contributed to a better understanding of current 
challenges in incident learning in healthcare organisations.  
As different from existing case studies, our target group included not only IT 
professionals but also healthcare professionals. This provided us with diversified 
perspectives from different job roles. Non-IT professionals' engagement in incident 
response is also essential for incident response. We found that healthcare professionals 
were more engaged in high security incidents then low security incidents. They 
preferred to have incident case studies in staff security training course. A key challenge 
for security management we identified is how to report incidents to multiple 
stakeholders with varying levels of competence and background knowledge. 
To address those issues, we have suggested the assurance modelling framework. 
As different from Ahmad's step-by-step learning model, our approach aims to provide a 
unified way to gather incident knowledge and tackle the obstacles of incident reporting 
to different stakeholders. It also brings in the theory of arguments that allow people to 
reason about linkage between the lessons learned and security management standards. 
Moreover, we have discussed the suitability of this approach in tackling the current 
challenges in security incident learning in healthcare. Future work should expand on 
these sections on the evaluation of this approach in an industrial setting. Future work 
should also consider stakeholders from other administrative job roles such as patients 
registration and finance. 
This paper researches into incident learning within the organisation. From a 
broader perspective, security lessons should be exchanged across different organisations 
as similar security incidents can happen in different organisations. There are some 
initiatives to encourage incident exchange between organisations. UK has launched the 
Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership (CISP) to help government and 
industry on cyber security threats vulnerabilities exchange [66]. European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA) requests member states to report security 
incidents to enable the exchange of lessons from incidents [66]. There is a need of a 
structured framework to exchange security lessons. Assurance modelling framework 
suggested in this paper provided a structured manner to gather, disseminate and feed 
back incident knowledge. Our research provided the basis for future research into 
incident knowledge exchange between organisations.  
However, assurance modelling framework alone cannot address all the obstacles 
in incident learning. It needs to be aligned with other methods such as double loop 
organisational learning, dynamic security learning (DSL) process model and security 
checklist to improve organisations' incident learning capabilities. 
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Figure 1. The adjusted assurance modelling framework. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Workflow on feeding back lessons to security management procedure using 
assurance modelling framework. 
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